Two Shipping Disputes between Gdańsk, Denmark and Lübeck of 1509 and 1510 in the Context of the Conflicts over the Kalmar Union

Abstract

The attitude of Gdańsk towards the war between Denmark and Sweden of 1501–1512 still has not been fully researched by historians. The city, which gained some autonomy in its contacts with foreign powers after 1454, remained neutral towards this conflict. This status did not change after Lübeck and the other Wendish cities had joined the war on the Swedish side, which increased the risk for Gdańsk with regard to shipping through the Danish Straits. Gdańsk maritime trade suffered losses due to the privateers commissioned by both Danish King Hans and the Lübeck city council. This article examines two cases of ships from Gdańsk that were seized. In 1509, the vessel of skipper Hans Paul, which carried armour for the garrison of Malbork Castle, was captured by Danish privateers, and on 30 May 1510, three ships that were sailing back to Gdańsk from Western Europe were seized by Lübeckers. The main purpose of this case study, which is based largely on the correspondence included in the official Gdańsk town records currently stored in the State Archives in Gdańsk, is to find out how those disputes were conducted and what impact they had on the city, its maritime trade and diplomacy. The cargo of armour seized in 1509 was recovered only with the help of a Polish envoy in Copenhagen, who cooperated with the envoy sent by the city of Gdańsk. In the second case, Gdańsk authorities made attempts (which included sending official letters and legations, and talks during the Hanseatic diets) to recover them at least until the 1540s, albeit to no effect. This failure was a consequence of Gdańsk’s neutral status, which limited the influence the city had over King Hans and the city authorities of Lübeck. Also, the safety of navigation in the Danish Straits was a priority for Gdańsk.

Keywords: Gdańsk, Lübeck, Denmark, Kalmar Union, Hansa, privateering, diplomacy, maritime history

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The economic position of late medieval and early modern Gdańsk (Ger. Danzig) – as one of the biggest Hanseatic ports on the Baltic coast and Poland’s main foreign trade centre – depended largely on the safety of sea routes. Maritime conflicts, especially the Baltic ones, threatened the city’s maritime trade, no matter whether it remained neutral or not. Until the sixteenth century, privateering was actually the only way of waging naval war to harass the shipping that was considered hostile. It affected both the external and internal affairs of the city because such practices often resulted in disputes over seized ships and the goods they carried on board between their former owners and the authorities that had commissioned the privateers.

During the conflicts over the Kalmar Union in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries privateering was carried on especially by Lübeck and Denmark, mainly in the Baltic Sea. So was the case with two wars between the Danish-Norwegian King Hans and Swedish Regents Sten Sture the Elder and his successor Svante Nilsson (Natt och Dag) in the years 1497 and 1501–1512, involving Lübeck and the rest of the Wendish cities that entered the conflict on Swedish side after 1509, and waged another war against their trade competitors from Holland (1510–1514). Gdańsk shipping and maritime trade suffered from the activity of privateers in both conflicts, despite the city being a neutral party and its subordination to the Polish Kingdom. In general, it is possible to identify at least 20 seizures of Gdańsk vessels by Danish privateers in the whole period of 1497–1512, 19 by Lübeck’s privateers in the years 1510–1512 and three by Hollandish sailors in the service of the Danish Kingdom after 1509. As an example, in 1509, Danish privateers seized a vessel from Gdańsk that was carrying the cargo of armour being shipped from Amsterdam to Malbork Castle. On 30 May 1510, three ships were taken to Lübeck during their return journey from Holland and England to Gdańsk. In comparison with other actions undertaken by Danish privateers against the maritime trade of Gdańsk.

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between 1501 and 1512, the incident of 1509 is an exemption. It is parallel to the second one due to similar circumstances, such as the route of the vessels, the time of the incident and the envoys engaged in the diplomatic missions. Those two incidents are, however, exceptional as they are both relatively well documented in primary sources, in contrast to many other cases. They provide details on the seized cargo and information not only about the members of the social elite but also about the regular seamen who were involved in the disputes, which is rather unique for the merchant shipping of Gdańsk in the early sixteenth century.

This article aims to discuss both of the mentioned acts of sea robbery that were followed by maritime disputes between Gdańsk on the one hand, and Denmark and Lübeck on the other. They shed a light on the external policy of Gdańsk and how it interacted with the diplomacy of the Polish King Sigismund I during the first years of his reign, as the city recognised his rule but retained some sort of autonomy when dealing with foreign powers. Those disputes also illustrate how the skippers and other crew members participated in restitution activities and how the privateering affected the urban community. It is possible to examine the similarities and differences between Danish and Wendish threats to the maritime trade of neutral Gdańsk, in particular the western trade direction, while neither of the discussed cases was directly related to the nearly simultaneous Hollandish-Wendish conflict. Through the case studies of both incidents, it will be demonstrated that the municipal authorities of Gdańsk were limited in what they could do to resolve both conflicts in their favour due to several factors: a) the city’s neutral status; b) limited support from the Polish king; c) dependence on the final decision of the Danish king or the Lübeck city council (i.e. the authorities that commissioned the privateers); d) prioritising the security of Gdańsk shipping through the Danish Straits.

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Maritime disputes and privateer activity as an issue in Gdańsk's relations with other Hanseatic towns and cities and Scandinavian kingdoms during the conflicts over the Kalmar Union, the Thirteen Years' War (1454–1466) and the Anglo-Hanseatic War (1469–1474) have already been researched by historians, but they mostly focused on the second half of the fifteenth century and the reign of the Danish King Christian II (1513–1523). The turn of the sixteenth century still requires further investigation.

The sources examined for this article consist of the collection of incoming correspondence and documents until 1525 (Pol. *Dokumenty i korespondencja do 1525*) and the books of outgoing correspondence (Lat. *Missiva* or *Libri Missuarium*), both of which belonged to the official Gdańsk town records that are currently stored in the State Archives of Gdańsk. Those sources were supplemented with published editions and unedited records of external affairs.
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Official letters were not only a working tool for the Hanseatic merchants but were also used by municipal authorities that provided a kind of notary service for burghers. Also, maritime disputes were usually conducted through the exchange of correspondence (less often by sending legations), as it was a matter of diplomatic relations rather than a legal proceeding at the turn of the sixteenth century.

Gdańsk remained neutral during the Scandinavian wars at the turn of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries for at least two reasons: because of the Polish-Danish treaty of 1419 (renewed in 1509) and primarily due to Gdańsk’s own privateering during the Thirteen Years’ War (1454–1466). Gdańsk’s politics resulted in disruption of the westward shipping through the Danish Straits and

Schäfer, Leipzig 1899 (hereinafter cited as HR III/6); **Hanserecesse von 1477–1530**, Abt. 3, Bd. 7, hrsg. v. Dietrich Schäfer, Leipzig 1905 (hereinafter cited as HR III/7); **Hanserecesse von 1477–1530**, Abt. 3, Bd. 9, hrsg. v. Dietrich Schäfer, Friedrich Techen, Leipzig 1913 (hereinafter cited as HR III/9); **Danziger Inventar 1531–1591**, hrsg. v. Paul Simson, München–Leipzig 1913; **Liv-, est- und kurländisches Urkundenbuch**, Abt. 2, Bd. 3, hrsg. v. Leonid Arbusow, Riga–Moskau 1914 (hereinafter cited as LEK UB II/3); **Hanserecesse von 1531–1560**, Abt. 4, Bd. 2, hrsg. v. Klaus Friedland, Gottfried Wentz, Köln–Wien 1970 (hereinafter cited as HR IV/2); **Akta stanów Prus Królewskich**, t. 5, cz. 2, wyd. Marian Biskup, Warszawa–Poznań 1974 (hereinafter cited as ASPK V/2); **Akta stanów Prus Królewskich**, t. 5, cz. 3, wyd. Marian Biskup, Warszawa–Poznań–Toruń 1975 (hereinafter cited as ASPK V/3). A large part of primary sources was edited and published, usually as abstracts, in aforementioned publications, which is hereinafter indicated in parenthesis. It should be also noted that the references provided in those publications are not up-to-date because the documents of the official Gdańsk town records stored in the State Archives of Gdańsk were reclassified during the twentieth century.

9 Archiv der Hansestadt Lübeck, Altés Senatsarchiv (hereinafter cited as AHL, ASA), Externa.


12 B. Możewko, „Peter von Danzig”, p. 260.


harmed its relations with Lübeck, where a privateer from Gdańsk was executed in 1460 and goods of merchants from Gdańsk were confiscated in 1460–1462.

Between the fourteenth and sixteenth centuries, Lübeck was the hub of Hanseatic and non-Hanseatic trade because of its privileges and location between the Baltic and Northern Seas with great importance for the western-directed trade of Gdańsk and other Prussian, Livonian and Swedish cities. At the same time, the sea route through the Danish Straits, which provided a direct link between Prussian and Livonian cities and the trade markets of Holland, England and the French Atlantic coast, was endangered too. In the years 1455–1458 there was an open conflict between the Danish King Christian I and the city of Gdańsk which supported Christian’s rival to the Swedish throne, Karl Knutsson (Bonde), and fought on the side of the Kingdom of Poland against the Teutonic Order allied with Denmark. Furthermore, between the Polish-Danish truce of 1458 and the peace of 1462, ships from Gdańsk which tried to avoid the Danish toll in Øresund by sailing through the Great Belt were seized by the Danes. Burghers of Gdańsk were also unable to receive the exemption from the Sound toll during the last years of Christian I’s reign and at the beginning of the rule of his son Hans (i.e. in 1481 and 1483). Moreover, the burghers of Gdańsk did not receive any aid from Lübeckers in that matter.

Direct navigation through the Danish Straits was considered a threat to Lübeck’s commercial interest, in particular, due to the presence of Hollanders and, to a lesser extent, the English in the Hanseatic trade centres of Prussia and

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Livonia, which was noticeable already in the fourteenth century. As a result, the Wendish attempt to impose a naval blockade of Øresund during the war against Denmark in 1509–1512 was also aimed against the Hollandish shipping (especially in 1510–1511, however, the hostilities lasted until the truce of 1514). Hollanders also had an aggressive attitude towards their Wendish competitors but it was Lübeck’s enmity towards the presence of Hollanders in the Baltic markets that hurt the interests of other Hanseatic cities in Prussia and Livonian the most. Both the diplomatic (carried out in, for example, Bruges, where a Hanseatic Kontor was located, until 1502) and the military efforts directed against Hollanders exacerbated the general conflict of interest within the Hanse, which occurred between Lübeck on the one hand, and Gdańsk and other Prussian and Livonian cities on the other, in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. It was caused by a growing economic integration of the latter with their Polish hinterland, which had a major impact on their direct cooperation with Hollandish merchants, i.e. without Lübeck’s intermediation. In addition, Lübeck and Gdańsk were in different political situations, because the latter did not belong to the Holy Roman Empire. This was also one of the


21 For the concept of the ‘offensive’ presence of Hollanders on the Baltic Sea and their ‘defensive’ presence on the North Sea during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, see L. Sicking, Die Offensive Lösung, pp. 39–51; idem, Neptune and the Netherlands, pp. 207, 242, 286–288.

22 K. Spading, Holland und die Hanse, pp. 85, 92–93.


24 H. Samsonowicz, Rozluźnienie związku z Hanżą, p. 326.
excuses used by Emperor Maximilian I in the 1500s to repress Gdańsk and its burgurers. Maximilian also backed Lübeck in its fight against Denmark, but not against Hollanders after 1509. However, the emperor was not involved in the resolution of both maritime conflicts discussed here.

The Danish embargo on Swedish trade had a smaller impact on Gdańsk shipping, although the city was the second biggest intermediary for Swedish trade with Western Europe, second only to Lübeck. The maritime connection between Gdańsk and Stockholm was mutually beneficial, as argued by Marian Biskup, due to Gdańsk's neutral status and the changing (until 1508) attitude of Lübeck towards Sweden. Thus, Sweden needed a stable trade partner, especially during the war against Denmark. In turn, Gdańsk gained an outlet for its exports and a source of raw materials, especially the osmund iron from Sweden that was reforged in Gdańsk. However, according to Marian Malowist, the maritime trade with Western Europe was still more important for Gdańsk's economy. Thus, the disruption of trade with Sweden, caused by the uprising of Sten Sture the Elder, the Danish naval blockade imposed in 1501 and Gdańsk's neutral stance in the Danish-Swedish conflict, was undoubtedly less harmful to Gdańsk burghers than the possible closing of Øresund. In any case, the maritime shipping from Gdańsk to Sweden was never completely brought to a halt even after 1501, although it decreased. This continuous trade between Sweden and Gdańsk caused maritime disputes over Danish privateering activity.

In the first half of 1509, Polish nobleman Ambroży Pampowski, Voivode of Sieradz and Starost of Malbork, arranged an arms deal in Amsterdam for...
the needs of the garrison of Malbork Castle\textsuperscript{32}, due to the threat from the Teutonic Order\textsuperscript{33}. It was carried out by a Gdańsk merchant Johann Harxson, called ‘Slampamp’\textsuperscript{34}. Three barrels of armour were carried along with other goods that belonged to Gdańsk merchants, at the bottom of a ship owned by burghers of Gdańsk and Słupsk (Ger. Stolp), with Hans Paul (Pawel) as a skipper\textsuperscript{35}. On the other hand, in some sources regarding this case, only information about sailing in ballast can be found\textsuperscript{36}. The contradiction between those accounts can be explained by the existence of a custom called \textit{Führung}. It was the right of ship crew members to carry a certain amount of cargo on their account (as part of a seaman’s wage), which was not included in the ship’s cargo list\textsuperscript{37}. What makes this explanation even more likely is the regulations introduced in Gdańsk in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries under which a skipper was allowed to carry one last of cargo as his \textit{Führung} (i.e. 2,000 kg according to the estimations by Stanislaw Matysik\textsuperscript{38}).
Hans Paul’s ship encountered a Danish privateer under the command of the so-called ‘Grote Cordt’ in the western Baltic Sea. Such vessels were tasked with enforcing the embargo that had been imposed by Denmark on all trade with Sweden in 1501 and repeated after the 1504–1505 armistice. The embargo had already been acknowledged by the Gdańsk city council, and later considered legitimate by the Polish King Sigismund I in 1509, although the city’s shipping to and from Sweden was never formally stopped.

According to the Gdańsk source (related to the later restitution activity), the incident took place near Bornholm (‘bye Bornholm’). However, the Danish source specified a different location – between the Jasmund Peninsula (the Island of Rügen) and the Island of Hiddensee (‘twisschen Jaszmonde unnd Hedensze’). Considering that the former was probably based on second-hand information (as the Gdańsk city council and burghers could not have the opportunity to contact directly the ship crew that was brought to Copenhagen) and that the latter contains more detailed information, the Danish version is more plausible.

To estimate the time of this incident one has to find out when the information about the seizure of the ship reached Gdańsk, provided that formalities related to the reclamation efforts started as soon as it was possible. The legation led by Gdańsk municipal secretary Jürgen Zimmerman, which left the city
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after 23 June 1509, came to Copenhagen on 10 July 1509. Gdańsk city council’s notification about this event was prepared for the Danish king as late as 18 July and brought along with a similar (not preserved) letter from Pamkowski to Copenhagen on 3 August. It means that probably in late June and the first days of July, the information about skipper Hans Paul’s problems still did not reach Gdańsk. Taking into account the time needed for the spread of information, it can be assumed that the ship’s seizure happened no later than in May or early June 1509.

The accounts from Gdańsk and Denmark did not differ from each other too much. When the privateers asked skipper Hans Paul about the cargo, he mentioned only the ballast, concealing the transport of three barrels with armour, as well as the other cargo. It was found only after the search that took place later, off the coast of Hiddensee. After that, the skipper supposedly admitted that he had been aware it was a prohibited cargo due to the aforementioned embargo. According to the Danish version of the events, he also tried to convince Grote Cordt to let him go after throwing the barrels overboard, which did not succeed. On the other hand, the rest of the crew, who had been interrogated by the privateers, assured that they knew nothing about the transport of armour. Later, complaints were made about the behaviour of the privateers breaking up sailors’ chests as well as other barrels. Moreover, they tore merchants’ letters into pieces and threw them overboard. Finally, as a consequence, Hans Paul was accused of shipping contraband to Sweden. Such a thing would have been a violation of the Danish embargo.

The ship was brought to Copenhagen as a prize, with all the goods it transported. In the capital of Denmark, the crew members, apart from Hans Paul,
gave sworn depositions admitting that they did not know about the skipper’s cargo of armour. This was later exploited by King Hans’s chancellery during the conflict over restitution with Gdańsk authorities57. The skipper presumably was still in Copenhagen at least at the end of July 150958.

Reclamation efforts made by the Gdańsk authorities and burghers were, as already mentioned, associated with the legation of municipal secretary Zim- merman to Copenhagen in 150959. It was followed by an unsuccessful mission of another Gdańsk secretary Ambrosius Storm, who had been sent to Denmark a year earlier60. Gdańsk’s second attempt to settle the claims for restitution of seized ships was probably connected with the beginning of peace negotiations between King Hans and his Swedish enemies, as well as with the Polish diplomatic activity towards Scandinavian kingdoms and the Wendish cities. In the spring and summer of 1509, a delegation sent by Swedish Riksrådet and Regent Svante Nilsson negotiated peace terms with their Danish counterparts in Copenhagen61. From the point of view of the Gdańsk city councillors, it heralded probably the turning point in the Scandinavian conflict, especially since another (also rejected) proposal for an anti-Danish alliance was sent to

57 Depositions of helmsman (sturman) Laurentz Runge and sailors (botzmannen) Jacob Rode, Clawes Hoppe and Diems Smith are mentioned in: HR III/5, no. 461; see also HR III/5, no. 459: 20–24. The appearance of crewmembers other than skippers in primary sources concerning Hanseatic maritime disputes at the turn of the sixteenth century is very rare. It was probably connected with the decline of the social and economic status of sailors during that period. For Gdańsk in the fifteenth century, see Edmund Cieślak, Położenie prawne marynarki w wieku XIV i XV w świetle uchwał Związku Hanzeatyckiego, Zapiski Towarzystwa Naukowego w Toruniu, t. 16: 1950, z. 1–4, pp. 134, 137; idem, Prawa i obowiązki kapitana statku w XII do XV w. według Rôles d’Oléron i prawa morskiego Związku Miast Hanzeatyckich z XIV i XV w., Zapiski Towarzystwa Naukowego w Toruniu, t. 17: 1951, z. 1–2, pp. 73–74.

58 Zimmerman to Gdańsk, Copenhagen, 28 July 1509, APG 300, D/78, 75 (HR III/5, no. 457): ‘Szo ist hyr, weysen hernn, Hans Pauel von weggen etczlichs harnasch angehalet’.

59 Settling the maritime disputes as an objective of Zimmerman’s mission is indicated in a draft of a recommendation letter, see Gdańsk to the archbishop of Lund, 1 June 1509, APG 300, D/14, 279 (HR III/5, no. 445).

60 Storm to Gdańsk, Rostock, 20 February 1508, APG 300, D/78, 58 (HR III/5, no. 349); Danish King Hans to Gdańsk, 1 March 1508, APG, 300, D/14, 266 (HR III/5, no. 351); Wiertold Szczuczko, Storm Ambroży, [in:] Słownik biograficzny Pomorza Nadwiślańskiego, t. 4, red. Zenon Nowak, Gdańsk 1997, pp. 275–277.


other way around was a common practice at the turn of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries because the cargo was typically examined at the harbour, see A. Kammler, op.cit., p. 34.
Gdańsk by the Wendish cities on 22 June 1509, i.e. two days after the diet of those cities in Lübeck.

At the same time, the Polish legation to Denmark and Sweden was prepared. It was connected with the Danish diplomatic missions to the Polish King Sigismund I in November 1508 and May 1509. The negotiations concerned the proposition of royal marriage between Prince Christian of Denmark and Sigismund’s daughter Elisabeth, the renewal of the 1419 alliance and the problem of the embargo on maritime trade between Gdańsk and Sweden.

Before the legation was sent, there was an opportunity for detailed consultations between King Sigismund, his Grand Chancellor Jan Łaski and a delegation from Royal Prussia, including the Bishop of Warmia (Ger. Ermland) Lucas Watzenrode and Gdańsk Burgomaster Jürgen Mandth, which took place on 30 March 1509 during the Sejm in Piotrków. During those talks, Gdańsk city authorities expressed to King Sigismund their deep scepticism towards the renewal of the alliance with Denmark and the potential imposition of the Polish embargo on trade with Sweden in addition to the existing Danish one.

Further consultations were held in Gdańsk between the city council and Sigismund’s secretary Joannes Dantiscus (who nota bene originated from Gdańsk) in May 1509. Finally, Hans von Köckritz – a Lusatian knight in the service of King Sigismund I – was sent as an envoy to Copenhagen via the Hansetag in Lübeck which was held in June 1509. He came to Copenhagen in June 1509, where he had an opportunity to conduct talks both with his Danish hosts as well as with the Swedish delegation that came to Copenhagen for peace negotiations. During the journey, he sent a letter to Gdańsk in which he wrote, among other things, about his help in Gdańsk’s restitution efforts.

As mentioned above, Zimmerman left Gdańsk not earlier than 23 June and reached the Danish capital on 8 July 1509, but due to the long absence of King Hans and Danish-Swedish peace talks he had to wait almost a month for an opportunity to address the Danish monarch and he was not even allowed to have an audience with the king. Finally, on 2 August Zimmerman submitted
the written version of his legation\textsuperscript{69}. Among other issues, such as the Danish embargo against Sweden, the security of Gdańsk maritime trade and the privileges of Gdańsk in Scanian fish markets, the document included the following cases of aggrieved skippers from Gdańsk: a) Paul Lemke, who sailed from Gdańsk to Riga in the spring of 1506\textsuperscript{70}; b) Jacob von Noten and merchant Paul van Vemeren of 1507\textsuperscript{71}; c) Hening Tegell, whose ship was seized on 20 July 1507 during a cruise from Reval (Est. Tallinn) to Königsberg and Gdańsk\textsuperscript{72}; d) Martin Quessen, who sailed from Reval to Gdańsk in 1508\textsuperscript{73}; e) Jacob Wille of 1508 or 1509\textsuperscript{74}; as well as the cases of cargo from Gdańsk transported by ships of Pomeranian skippers Paul Gernt of Goleniów (Ger. Gollnow) and

\textsuperscript{69} HR III/5, no. 459: 8–13; HR III/5, no. 460.

\textsuperscript{70} Reval to Gdańsk, 27 May 1506, APG 300, D/9, 347 (HR III/5, no. 119); Gdańsk to Danish King Hans, 5 June 1506, APG 300, 27/7, p. 259v (HR III/5, no. 120); Gdańsk to Jons Christerson and Jens Holgerssen (Ulfstand), 6 June 1506, APG 300, 27/7, p. 260 (HR III/5, no. 121); Danish King Hans to Gdańsk, Copenhagen, 5 August 1506, APG 300, D/13, 256 (HR III/5, no. 123); Gdańsk to Danish King Hans, 19 August 1506, APG 300, 27/7, pp. 267v–268v (HR III/5, no. 130); Visby to Gdańsk, 2 September 1506, APG 300, D/11, 256 (HR III/5, no. 131); Danish King Hans to Gdańsk, Antvorskov, 8 September 1506, APG, 300, D/13, 258 (HR III/5, no. 132); Gdańsk to Danish King Hans, 14 September 1506, APG 300, 27/7, p. 272v (HR III/5, no. 133); Gdańsk to Visby, 22 September 1506, APG 300, 27/7, p. 272 (HR III/5, no. 134); Gdańsk to Burgomaster Johann Scheweke and Councillor Eberhardt Ferber, Gdańsk, 9 May 1507, APG 300, D/78, 49 (HR III/5, no. 245: 34); Danish King Hans to Gdańsk, Roskilde, 1 March 1508, APG, 300, D/14, 266 (HR III/5, no. 351); HR III/5, no. 460, 461; Danish King Hans to Gdańsk, Copenhagen, 24 June 1510, APG 300, D/14, 280 (HR III/5, no. 621, 622). See also the draft of a letter sent from Gdańsk to the Danish king incorrectly dated by archivists at around the 1520s: APG 300, D/14, 368. See an earlier attempt to examine this case of a maritime dispute in: Paweł Sadłoń, Spra-wa zajęcia statku szypra Pawła Lemkego z 1506 roku, Argumenta Historica. Czasopismo Nauko-wo-Dydaktyczne, nr 1: 2014, pp. 119–124.

\textsuperscript{71} Danish King Hans to Gdańsk, Copenhagen, 8 November 1507, APG, 300, D/13, 264 (HR III/5, no. 295); Danish King Hans to Gdańsk, Roskilde, 1 March 1508, APG, 300, D/14, 266 (HR III/5, no. 351); HR III/5, no. 460, 461; Danish King Hans to Gdańsk, Copenhagen, 24 June 1510, APG 300, D/14, 280 (HR III/5, no. 621, 622).

\textsuperscript{72} Reval to Danish King Hans, 17 July 1507, LEK UB II/3, no. 218, 219; Danish King Hans to Gdańsk, Roskilde, 1 March 1508, APG, 300, D/14, 266 (HR III/5, no. 351); HR III/5, no. 460, 461; Danish King Hans to Gdańsk, Copenhagen, 24 June 1510, APG 300, D/14, 280 (HR III/5, no. 621, 622).

\textsuperscript{73} Reval to Gdańsk, 10 June 1508, APG 300, D/9, 353 (LEK UB II/3, no. 386); Reval to Danish King Hans, 10 June 1508, LEK UB II/3, no. 387; Gdańsk to Danish King Hans, 4 August 1508, APG 300, 27/7, pp. 309–309v (HR III/5, no. 386); HR III/5, no. 460, 461; Danish King Hans to Gdańsk, Copenhagen, 24 June 1510, APG 300, D/14, 280 (HR III/5, no. 621, 622).

\textsuperscript{74} HR III/5, no. 459, 461; Danish King Hans to Gdańsk, Copenhagen, 24 June 1510, APG 300, D/14, 280 (HR III/5, no. 621, 622).
Hinrick Tabbert of Szczecin (Ger. Stettin)⁷⁵; and the case of stranded goods from the ship of a skipper from Lübeck, Hans Heidemann⁷⁶.

Even though the envoy wrote about Hans Paul in the letter to Gdańsk of 28 June 1509⁷⁷, he was not included in that list⁷⁸. It was probably due to the lack of documents and certificates that were, as mentioned above, sent from Gdańsk as late as 18 July. When Slampamp’s messenger delivered them to Zimmerman on 3 August, the envoy went to the Danish king for an additional audience as early as the next day⁷⁹. However, his attempt to explain the circumstances of the armour shipment for Malbork Castle during a conversation with King Hans was unsuccessful⁸⁰. Later that day Gdańsk envoy met with von Köckritz to discuss their cooperation in that and other matters⁸¹.

Two days later, on 6 August 1509, in the presence of the Danish king, Zimmerman received a written response to his complaints, in which the king refused to return or compensate for the seizures of goods and ships belonging to the merchants of Gdańsk, including Hans Paul’s⁸². In this case, King Hans justified his decision by the sworn depositions made by the ship crewmembers and by the relations of the privateers, based on which the barrels with armour were classified as contraband⁸³. This means that the documents prepared by the Gdańsk city council and Pampowski were not even taken into consideration. Zimmerman only achieved the opportunity for an additional audience after reading the king’s response⁸⁴. After the consultations with von Köckritz⁸⁵, he prepared his own written response to it⁸⁶. The content of this document had also been consulted with the Polish envoy before Zimmerman tried, unsuccessfully, to personally submit it to the Danish king on 9 August 1509⁸⁷. With regard to Hans Paul’s ship, Zimmerman repeated the official statements of the Gdańsk city authorities and Pampowski, also emphasising that the Danish king was already familiar with them. Moreover, he mentioned the possibility

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⁷⁵ HR III/5, no. 459, 460, 461; Danish King Hans to Gdańsk, Copenhagen, 24 June 1510, APG 300, D/14, 280 (HR III/5, no. 621, 622).
⁷⁶ HR III/5, no. 460, 461; Danish King Hans to Gdańsk, Copenhagen, 24 June 1510, APG 300, D/14, 280 (HR III/5, no. 621, 622).
⁷⁷ Zimmerman to Gdańsk, Copenhagen, 28 July 1509, APG 300, D/78, 75 (HR III/5, no. 457).
⁷⁸ HR III/5, no. 460.
⁷⁹ HR III/5, no. 459: 14.
⁸⁰ Ibid.
⁸¹ HR III/5, no. 459: 15.
⁸² HR III/5, no. 459: 16–17; HR III/5, no. 461.
⁸³ HR III/5, no. 461.
⁸⁴ HR III/5, no. 459: 17
⁸⁵ HR III/5, no. 459: 18–19.
⁸⁶ HR III/5, no. 459: 20–24.
⁸⁷ HR III/5, no. 459: 25–27.
of an intervention by the Polish King Sigismund. Using such an argument would have not been possible without Zimmerman’s cooperation with von Köckritz. The activity of the latter led to issuing another reply by King Hans the following day. The king agreed to, among other things, release Hans Paul’s ship with the cargo, including the armour, on condition that if, subsequently, it had turned out to be Swedish contraband, Slampamp would be punished by the authorities in Gdańsk. Both envoys had to prepare a written statement to comply with this, which they did as quickly as on 14 August 1509, along with the reclamation receipt provided by Zimmerman on the same day.

Interestingly, it was the only case of a Gdańsk ship seized by Danish privateers on its route beyond the Baltic Sea, and also the only one in which Zimmerman reached an agreement with King Hans during his legation of 1509. It would have been impossible without the support of von Köckritz (i.e. the consultations with Zimmerman and the argument involving the possible intervention of the Polish king), who had already written several times to the Gdańsk city council about his willingness to cooperate with the city authorities on the shipping disputes. Both envoys dealt with other issues during their missions, such as the aforementioned talks that were held by von Köckritz with his Danish and Swedish counterparts in Copenhagen, which lead to the renewal of the treaty concluded in 1419 between Poland and Denmark. He also helped Zimmerman in negotiations with Danish authorities on the issues regarding the fish market in Scania. As was usual during various legations, their efforts to return Hans Paul’s ship, together with the shipped armour, were not the only task of their missions, especially for the Polish envoy. The analysis offered above confirms Marian Biskup’s argumentation that the assistance of the latter was a key factor in reaching the agreement and that King Hans favoured the agreement because he wanted Gdańsk to remain neutral.

The result of the peace talks between the Danish Crown and the Swedes, which were held during the stay of Zimmerman and von Köckritz in Denmark, was the Treaty of Copenhagen signed on 17 August 1509, in which Swedish Riks-
rådet and Regent Svante Nilsson accepted the Danish king as their sovereign. However, this attempt to restore the Danish rule over Sweden failed due to Lübeck’s naval intervention in September and October 1509, which allowed Svante Nilsson to continue the conflict with King Hans, despite the peace agreement which ultimately remained unratiﬁed. These events increased the risk for the maritime trade of Gdańsk, which was further hindered by the formal war declaration between the Wendish cities and Denmark made on 21 April 1510.

As in the previous years, Gdańsk remained neutral, despite the efforts of both Lübeck and Denmark to get the city on their side. During the Hansetag in the summer of 1509, precisely, on 6 August 1509 representatives of the Wendish cities wrote to Gdańsk authorities with the proposition of breaking the past treaties with Denmark and establishing cooperation with them. In response to that, on 23 August 1509, the Gdańsk city council wrote and sent a letter highlighting the potential threat to their ships on their way home from Western Europe through the Danish Straits. The legation of Lübeck municipal secretary Hartwig Brekewolt to Gdańsk after 13 October 1509 probably had the same purpose as Lübeck’s proposal of an alliance against King Hans made in November of the same year, Gdańsk refused to enter into an agreement, although a squadron of ships from Lübeck, which had previously fought against Denmark, found shelter there during the winter of 1510 after a heavy storm at the end of 1509.

At the beginning of the new sailing season of 1510, both sides tried again to ally with Gdańsk. On 20 March 1510, Lübeck asked for aid in the upcoming war with Denmark, warned against sailing west through Øresund and discouraged any support to King Hans, which meant that Lübeck announced the activity of their privateers against Denmark. A similar letter was sent to Gdańsk from Copenhagen four days later. In both answers, to Lübeck on
18 April 1510\textsuperscript{106} and to Denmark the next day\textsuperscript{107}, Gdańsk city council declared and justified their neutral status and refused to cease trade and shipping with either side, including sails through Danish-controlled Øresund. In the context of the correspondence between Gdańsk and Lübeck of 1510, it is quite clear that there was a kind of assurance from the latter, given during the mission of Brekewolt, about the safety of navigating through the aforementioned strait by ships from Gdańsk, as long as they would not enter Danish ports. At least Gdańsk authorities interpreted it in that way. Nevertheless, there were also strong suggestions from Lübeck to sail through the Great Belt instead of Øresund\textsuperscript{108}, where a Danish toll-collecting station was located. The Wendish-Hollandish competition did not appear in the discussed correspondence as a reason for the hostile actions against the maritime trade of Gdańsk going through the Danish Straits.

At the end of July 1510, Lübeck sent to Gdańsk another warning of the risk of their own privateering activity in Øresund, along with the guarantee of security on other sea routes, due to the expected return of ships from Western European seaports to Gdańsk\textsuperscript{109}. However, it came too late. In the previous months, Gdańsk ships had already been seized. The preserved correspondence between the cities and other sources make it possible to analyse at least three cases of ships that were captured by Lübeck privateers on 30 May 1510\textsuperscript{110} in the Danish Straits, namely at the Kullaberg Peninsula and in Øresund itself, near Helsingør\textsuperscript{111}. The loss of a ship that belonged to skipper Anders Blancke and sailed from Zeeland was later\textsuperscript{112} valued (including the cargo that belonged...
to Gdańsk burghers) at 2,232 Prussian marks\(^{113}\). The ship owned by Gdańsk burgher Hans Stake sailed home from England, and its cargo was worth 1,498 Prussian marks\(^{114}\). The third ship sailed from Zeeland under the command of Arndt Smidt, and the seized property (both ship and its cargo) was worth 1,339.5 Prussian marks\(^{115}\). All those ships were brought to Lübeck\(^{116}\), which meant a tangible loss for several Gdańsk merchants\(^{117}\) due to both the value of the lost goods, and the deterioration of trade between Prussia and foreign countries, even located as remotely as Portugal\(^{118}\).

In Lübeck, the ships and cargoes were immediately treated as rightful prizes that were tradable. There was at least one ship\(^{119}\) that was sold before December 1510 as well as the cargo of lime from Hans Stake’s vessel\(^{120}\) that was sold at an unspecified time. At that time, Herman Falke, also a Lübeck burgher and a member of the local municipal elite, made transaction proposals to all three skippers while in Lübeck\(^{121}\). Apparently, no time was given for any restitution

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\(^{113}\) The seized cargo and other items consisted of olive oil from Lisbon, a barrel of pepper, a parrot, and a chest with clothes, which were the property of Henrik Bokelman, Hillebrandt Holthusen and Philip Bischop (see Sławomir Kościelak, Philip Bischof, [in:] Poczet sołtysów, burmistrzów, nadburmistrzów, przewodniczących Miejskiej Rady Narodowej i prezydentów Gdańsk, od XIII do XXI wieku, red. Beata Możejko, Gdańsk 2015, p. 127), as well as wine which was the property of Christoph Beyer, Benedict Roland, Tónies Neteler. See HR III/7, no. 43: 1.

\(^{114}\) The seized cargo included various types of cloth, beer, wool and lime which was the property of Gdańsk merchant and helmsman Reimer Krosse and was supposedly treated as Führung. See HR III/7, no. 43: 2.

\(^{115}\) The seized cargo consisted of salt, brazilwood (‘Caesalpinia Sappan’), which was the property of Christoph Beyer (see Brasilienholz, [in:] Frühneuhochdeutsches Wörterbuch, https://fwb-online.de/lemma/brasilienholz.s.2n?q=brisil&page=1 [accessed online 28 October 2022]), and Rochen, i.e. fish meat from Norway (see M. Małowist, Handel zagraniczny Sztokholmu, p. 28; Rodescher, [in:] Olaus Magnus, Historia de gentibus septentrionalibus, Romae 1555 [reprint, intro. and ed.: John Granlund, Copenhagen 1972], p. 731). See HR III/7, no. 43: 3.

\(^{116}\) Gdańsk to Lübeck, 12 July 1510, APG 300, 27/8, pp. 69v–70 (HR III/6, no. 9); Gdańsk to Rostock, 24 November 1510, APG 300, 27/8, pp. 80–80v (HR III/6, no. 69); HR III/6, no. 77: 6; Gdańsk to Lübeck, 24 May 1511, APG 300, D/71, 106 (HR III/6, no. 185).

\(^{117}\) Valentin Nagel and Bernd von Rees were also among them, see Gdańsk to Lübeck, 24 May 1511, APG 300, D/71, 106 (HR III/6, no. 185).

\(^{118}\) Gdańsk to Lübeck, 12 July 1510, APG 300, 27/8, pp. 69v–70 (HR III/6, no. 9); Lübeck to Gdańsk, 31 July 1510, APG 300, D/31, 584.

\(^{119}\) HR III/6, no. 77: 6.

\(^{120}\) HR III/7, no. 43: 2.

\(^{121}\) HR III/7, no. 39: 228; HR III/7, no. 113: 86.
procedures and written claims, which were sure to be expected from Gdańsk burghers and authorities after the seizure of the ships.

Privateering activity against Gdańsk merchant shipping in the Danish Straits caused dissatisfaction among Gdańsk burghers, and demands for the requisition of Lübeck property were made but they were rejected by the Gdańsk city council. On 12 July 1510, Gdańsk city councillors sent an official protest against privateering followed by a demand for restitution of seized goods and ships in general, not specifically with regard to that three ships. It was repeated 12 days later in a letter concerning the Hanseatic Kontor in Bruges. This issue was also mentioned in correspondence with other Wendish cities (e.g. in a letter sent to Rostock on 5 November 1510) and included in the list of objectives for Zimmerman’s legation to those cities, which was sent in December 1510. During this mission, the envoy from Gdańsk took part in the diet of the Wendish cities in January 1511, during which (on 20 and 21 January 1511) he raised the issues of freedom of navigation in Øresund (in place of the route through the Great Belt proposed by Lübeck), the security of Gdańsk merchant ships harassed by Lübeck privateers, and the demands for restitution and compensation for the financial losses inflicted on Gdańsk shipping. This, however, did not yield any results.

Subsequently, three merchants from Gdańsk, namely Philip Bischop, Bernt von Rees and Valentin Nagel, acted on their own by sending to Lübeck their plenipotentiary Wilhelm Rugenordt on 24 May 1511, but the sources from the entire first half of the sixteenth century indicated that those disputes were never settled. On the other hand, the ship crewmembers and skippers were probably not held in captivity, because such a problem was not mentioned in the sources. Moreover, one of the skippers, namely Arndt Smidt, was attacked by Lübeck privateers again on 19 June 1511 when he sailed from Zeland to Gdańsk with the goods belonging to Bernd Basman, Paul von Femern and aforementioned Bernt von Rees and Valentin Nagel. In the same year,
Gdańsk made efforts to settle the disputes with Lübeck and secure their westward shipping during the Hansetag in June 1511. This is evidenced by two separate instructions prepared for the Gdańsk delegation\textsuperscript{130}: one regarding the Hanseatic issues in general\textsuperscript{131} and the other regarding the Lübeck\textsuperscript{132} issues in particular, both of which included the disputed seizures of ships and goods\textsuperscript{133}. Before the Hanseatic diet in Lübeck, consultations with other Prussian towns and cities and the Polish King Sigismund I took place. The king assumed that the aforementioned treaty between Poland and Denmark renewed in 1509 was sufficient to ensure the safety of ships and merchants from Gdańsk\textsuperscript{134}. Nevertheless, von Köckritz was sent again as a Polish envoy to that Hansetag\textsuperscript{135}, along with the delegates from Gdańsk and other Prussian towns and cities\textsuperscript{136}. Setting the agreement on the safe passage through Øresund as a condition to start talks about other issues showed the determination of the Gdańsk delegation during this Hansetag\textsuperscript{137}. They focused more on the Lübeck privateers operating in Gdańsk Bay in 1511 and, in particular, on the safety of the Danish Straits, rather than on the financial losses suffered by Gdańsk merchants in 1510\textsuperscript{138}. Despite the Wendish-Hollandish maritime hostilities (e.g. Lübeck's complaints about the presence of Hollanders in Gdańsk appearing from January 1511\textsuperscript{139}, and the seizures of Hollandish ships in the Gulf of Gdańsk\textsuperscript{140}), both issues were discussed only in the context of the conflict with Denmark. As a result, the agreement between Gdańsk and Lübeck of 26 June 1511 delayed the solution of Gdańsk shipping loss problems until the end of the war with Denmark or the next Hansetag. Also, a commitment to restrict any individual actions by Gdańsk burghers to obtain compensation from Lübeck was made\textsuperscript{141}. It was more important to secure the shipping routes to Western Europe and in Gdańsk Bay against Wendish privateers. However, this agreement

\textsuperscript{130} Incorrect information about the delegates from Gdańsk acting as observers and not as participants during the Hansetag in 1511 was provided in: H. Samsonowicz, Rozłuźnienie związku z Hanzą, p. 327.

\textsuperscript{131} HR III/6, no. 192.

\textsuperscript{132} HR III/6, no. 191.

\textsuperscript{133} HR III/6, no. 192: 31: 'Der genamenen scheppe anno teyene'.

\textsuperscript{134} Gdańsk to Toruń, 19 March 1511, APG 300, 27/8, pp. 117v–119 (HR III/6, no. 108; ASPK V/2, no. 272); M. Biskup, Szwecja w kręgu polityki Jagiellonów, p. 384.

\textsuperscript{135} There was an initiative to declare King Sigismund I as the protector of the Hansa but it failed, see HR III/6, no. 188: 157–158; Gdańsk to Polish King Sigismund, 28 July 1511, APG 300, 27/8, pp. 129v–130v (ASPK V/3, no. 299).

\textsuperscript{136} HR III/6, no. 196: 1, 19.

\textsuperscript{137} HR III/6, no. 191.


\textsuperscript{139} HR III/6, no. 93: 37.

\textsuperscript{140} P. Simson, op. cit., p. 352.

\textsuperscript{141} HR III/6, no. 193: 1–3.
was broken when the Lübeck fleet attacked a large group of merchant ships, mostly Hollandish, off the Hel Peninsula near Gdańsk on 11 August 1511.

After the Treaty of Malmö had put an end to the war between Denmark, Sweden and the Wendish cities in 1512, Gdańsk still tried to receive compensation for the shipping losses suffered in 1510 and 1511 during the Hanseatic diets. The claims for the three ships seized in the Danish Straits in 1510 appeared during the Hansetag held in Lübeck in June and July of 1517, for which a detailed list of the financial losses was prepared. In the following year, during the next Hansetag, a delegation from Gdańsk held a long discussion with their Lübeck counterparts about those claims and other disputes caused by the activity of Wendish, primarily Lübeck, privateers during 1510 and 1511. Lübeck rejected those claims arguing that the Wendish cities warned against the privateers and that the burghers of Gdańsk were able to take legal actions in Lübeck. Among other things, the cases of Hans Stake, Anders Blanke and Arndt Schmidt were mentioned in the instruction for the delegates from Gdańsk to the Hansetag in May and June 1530, where the problem of past maritime disputes between the two cities was discussed. A similar situation likely occurred during the Hansetag of 1535 when the representatives of Gdańsk discussed the problem of actions against Gdańsk shipping taken by Lübeck privateers in 1510 and 1511 and during the 1520s and 1530s. A copy of the financial losses list that was prepared in 1517 can even be found among the documents covering maritime disputes that were collected by Lübeck authorities for the Hansetag in 1540.

Both the burghers and the city council of Gdańsk failed in their efforts to acquire the restitution of seized goods and the compensation for the financial losses caused by Lübeck privateers on 30 May 1510. The ships were not seized because of sailing from Zeeland and England but due to the Wendish blockade.
of Øresund. Gdańsk city authorities made a mistake by postponing the settlement indefinitely when the agreement with Lübeck was made in 1511. On the other hand, they did not have such support from King Sigismund I as in the case of Hans Paul’s ship in 1509. Previous and later efforts made by sending official letters or holding talks during the Hanseatic diets were insufficient against Lübeck’s stance in this matter. Interestingly, the Gdańsk city council did not escalate that conflict in the way they did after the aforementioned assault by the Lübeck fleet on the Hollandish ships near the Hel Peninsula in August 1511, when a group of Lübeck sailors who attacked the Hollanders was arrested and later beheaded in Gdańsk on 9 September 1511. The importance of those maritime disputes was apparently different. It is worth mentioning that during the compensation efforts made later, i.e. after 1512, their evolution from a diplomatic to a legal problem is noticeable.

In the case of both discussed incidents, the ships sailed to Gdańsk without violating the naval blockade. In 1509, skipper Hans Paul was falsely charged, and a year later the ships were seized despite previous arrangements with the envoy from Lübeck regarding the security of Gdańsk navigation in Øresund. According to examined sources, none of the vessels was seized because of sailing from Holland, Zeeland or England. Admittedly, the seamen on board those ships were not victims of lethal violence, although they were ill-treated by privateers during the inspection of Hans Paul’s ship. Those regular seamen were not involved in the restitution efforts that followed both incidents. On the other hand, the valuable cargo that was lost on board the three ships in 1510 belonged to the members of the ruling elite of Gdańsk which shaped the external policy of the city, e.g. Philip Bischof who became a burgomaster in 1517. The actions undertaken by Lübeck privateers in Øresund in 1510 threatened both the political and personal interests of those elite members, unlike the briefly mentioned cases of the seizures conducted by the Danes on the Baltic Sea in 1501–1509 and the discussed incident involving Hans Paul’s

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150 In a letter of 1512 there is an assurance that neither the cargo nor the land from where Arnd Smith’s ship sailed back to Gdańsk were hostile to Lübeck, but it was sent to the municipal authorities of Riga, which did not take part in the dispute, see Gdańsk to Riga, 31 March 1512, APG 300, 27/8, pp. 166v–167 (HR III/6, p. 282, footnote 2).

151 Gdańsk to Lübeck, 8 October 1511, HR III/6, no. 245, 246; Christoph Beyer des ältern Danziger Chronik, p. 461; P. Simson, op. cit., p. 353.

152 On this issue see the notarised protest of Gdańsk burghers Andreas Olsingk, Hans Abst- hagen and Hans Hillebrandt concerning their claims against the Wendish privateers, Lübeck, 14 July 1518, APG 300, D/31, 643; Allgemeine Versammlung der Hansestädte zu Lübeck 1540 trinitatis (Mai 23), Beilage C: Protestation der Danziger Abgesandten auf dem Hansetag von 1518, Lübeck 1540, AHL, ASA, Externa, Hanseatica, 159, pp. 29–33v.

ship, which caused a problem also for the aforementioned Pampowski and King Sigismund I.

Gdańsk city council did not question the legality of the actions taken by the Danish and Lübeck privateers during the conflict of 1501–1512. To settle the disputes that resulted from their actions against Gdańsk shipping, the city authorities used diplomatic methods, most often by sending official correspondence, and less often by holding talks during the Hanseatic diets and legations, during which municipal secretaries made efforts for the restitution of the seized goods and ships and the compensation for the suffered financial losses. As a neutral party in this war, Gdańsk had limited influence over the Danish King Hans and Lübeck city councillors, who had the final word and decided on the return of seized prizes along with their freight. The Polish King Sigismund I was not fully involved in such problems of Gdańsk burghers and the assistance provided by his envoys depended on the interest of his international policy. Throughout the entire period of this war, neither Lübeck nor Denmark wanted to engage in a military conflict with Gdańsk, despite the disputes. Also, Danish privateering on the Baltic Sea seemed to be less dangerous for the fundamental economic interests of Gdańsk burghers, namely the westward trade, than the privateering conducted at the behest of Lübeck in Øresund. This could be the explanation for the diplomatic efforts undertaken by Gdańsk in 1510 and 1511 when the settlement of the claims regarding the financial losses suffered by Gdańsk merchants in 1510 was moved to the background. There is a need for further research on this topic to better understand the rapid end of Gdańsk's neutrality policy in the years 1521–1523, when


155 For the need for further research on the Jagiellonian diplomatic contacts with Scandinavia during the sixteenth century, see M. Biskup, Szwecja w kręgu polityki Jagiellonów, p. 361. A letter sent by the Polish King Sigismund I to Gdańsk (Vilnius, 26 August 1507) is worth mentioning here. The letter conveys the king's disapproval of the municipal authorities of Gdańsk carrying out the city's foreign affairs within the Hansa and without consultations with the monarch, which is of great significance to the issues of Gdańsk's autonomy in its external relations and Sigismund's growing interest in international contacts with Scandinavian kingdoms and the Hansa. See APG 300, D/5, 661 (HR III/5, no. 285); see also Gdańsk to Polish King Sigismund, 27 July 1507, APG 300, 27/7, pp. 289v–290v (HR III/5, no. 280).

156 HR III/5, no. 459: 28.
the city sided with Sweden and Lübeck against the Danish King Christian II, shortly after the Polish-Teutonic war of 1519–1521.

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